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Pomeroy: If You Don't Care, Who Will?

IF YOU DON'T CARE, WHO WILL?
Chad J. Pomeroy*
You had to live-did live, from habit that became instinct-in the
assumption that every sound you made was overheard, and, except in
darkness, every moment scrutinized.1
I.

INTRODUCTION

As a property law professor, I have lately found myself thinking a
lot about privacy rights. Initially, the two topics (property and privacy)
perhaps do not seem closely related, but I think they are-or, at least, I
think the tie between the two is becoming much more pronounced and
important, as modern life becomes ever more techno-centric.2 I have
previously written about a particular aspect of this intersectionality, 3 but
I think the relationship is broader and stronger than I suspected at the
in
communication
the ubiquity of electronic
time, given
contemporaneous society and the concomitant deprivation of privacy.4
More specifically, I think that privacy rights are, at this point,
essentially an outgrowth of property rights. That is, one's right to
privacy is dependent on what we traditionally view as one's property
rights.5 At least, I think this is the current state of the law, given the
extent to which behemoth tech companies have created and dominated
modern communication-and the ability and right to profit from that
communication-and have almost wholly eliminated all traditional

* Turcotte R.C. Professor of Law, St. Mary's University School of Law.
1. GEORGE ORWELL, NINETEEN EIGHTY-FOUR 3 (1949).
2. See Emily A. Vogels, Millennials Stand Out for Their Technology Use, but Older
Generations Also
Embrace Digital Life,
PEw
RSCH. CTR.
(Sept.
9,
2019),

https://www.pewresearch.org/fact-tank/2019/09/09/us-generations-technology-use.
3. See Chad J. Pomeroy, All Your Air Right Are Belong to Us, 13 NW. J. TECH. & INTELL.
PROP. 277, 283-84, 293 (2015).
4. See Patricia SAnchez Abril et al., Blurred Boundaries: Social Media Privacy and the
Twenty-First-CenturyEmployee, 49 AM. BUS. L.J. 63, 96-97, 111 (2012) (stating that millennials do
not hesitate much when it comes to sharing information that some might consider private, as
indicated by their "copious digital dossiers").
5. See Chad J. Pomeroy, Why Is Property So Hard?, 65 RUTGERS L. REv. 505, 521 (2013).
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concepts of privacy and rights thereto. 6 In gross, this loss of privacy is
fairly momentous and overt. In practice, though, it is almost insidious.
While we understand and perceive it on a broad scale, it seems almost
accidental or inevitable, as applied to our emails, texts, posts, searches,
and so on-to all the various pieces that make up one's life in the current
moment.7 I perceive in this disconnect between what has happened to
our privacy rights and how little we seem to have noted the loss, as it
was happening, the solidification of the connection between privacy and
property.
That is, we can only have suffered such a massive loss of traditional
rights by giving them away.' We look at our current lives-every
internet search noted and studied, every photograph analyzed and sold,
every word overheard by Alexa or Siri-in amazement, perhaps. But
none of this is a surprise. None of this is not volitional. None of this
involves some company taking something from us-it is, all of it, an
abandonment of rights.9 And it is in this abandonment that we see the
firm foundation between privacy rights and property rights, as filtered by
the standard of reasonable expectations.
This connection may have ever been thus. However, I do not think
it has always been very well understood, as the concept of privacy rights
has traditionally been a little hard to pin down. 10 This Article seeks to
clarify modern privacy rights by making the connection between
property and privacy clear.' It also seeks to use that connection to make
some related predictions and suggestions about how to remediate some
of the current social losses of privacy, should society decide that is
desirable.12
It starts, in Part II, by setting the foundation for this discussion by
noting just a few of the ways in which privacy has eroded over the last
6. See Allum Bokhari, Who Is in Control? The Need to Rein in Big Tech, IMPRIMIS (Jan.
2021), https:/imprimis.hillsdale.edu/control-need-rein-big-tech.
7. The analogy that springs to mind, of course, is that of the boiling frog. If a frog is thrown
into boiling water, it will jump out-but if the same frog is put into mild water, which is then slowly
brought to a boil, it tepidly accepts its fate unto death. Eugene Volokh, The Mechanisms of the
Slippery Slope, 116 HARV. L. REV. 1026, 1105 (2003). Ask yourself: if someone had told you,
twenty years ago, that you would grant ownership rights of the pictures, videos, and stories you
write of your lover, spouse, kids, and friends to a multi-billion-dollar conglomerate based out of
California, what would you have said?
8.

See JESSE DUKEMINIER ET AL., PROPERTY 223, 226 (9th ed. 2018).

9. See id. ("The common law elements of abandonment are (1) the owner must intend to
relinquish all interests in the property, with no intention that it be acquired by any particular person,
and (2) there must be a voluntary act by the owner effectuating that intent.").
10. See DECKLE MCLEAN, PRIVACY AND ITS INVASION 3-6 (1995) ("Because the word
'privacy' is used so widely and so loosely, the concept remains inexact.").
11. See infra Part IV.
12. See infra Part V.
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couple of decades.13 Though not anywhere near comprehensive, this
demonstrates the extent to which our current lives are not really our
own.14 Part III places that destruction of privacy in a broader cultural and
historical context.15 These rights traditionally relied less on a purely
property-rights view, and more on a multi-faceted and subjective basis
tied to the ephemeral need to be left alone.1 6 The seeds for a
property-rights based conception of privacy were always present, but
were not clear.' 7
Part IV attempts to tie Parts II and III together, and to explain why
modern privacy issues are not really protected by historical standards. 18
In particular, it argues that privacy has always been a property right but
one that was easily dealt with elliptically. 19 That is, people have always
had protectible interests in being left alone or having their intimate acts
and communications kept private-but there was never a real need to
ground that right in an actual property right. 20 "Property" is a
complicated designation, arising organically over time, and not really
defined by any single right or obligation. 2 1 As such, it is not terribly
surprising that privacy was never centrally set within the ambit of
property law or property rights-traditionally, violations of privacy were
(relatively) rare, usually stemming from the socially unacceptable
actions and behaviors of other people.22 Those actions became the
understandable loci of analysis, instead of focusing on the inherent right
that was being violated. 23 That arguably no longer suffices in a world
where privacy violations have become a norm and a background against
which most communications occur. 24 More than that, though, it misses
the underlying right that has really always been at the core of the law's
recognition of privacy: a settled expectation to be left alone, within
context. 25 That expectation sounds in property, as variable as that area of
law is, recognizing this is an important and significant step in restoring
historical measures of privacy. 26
13.
14.
15.
16.
17.

See infra PartII.
See infra Part II.
See infra Part III.
See infra Part III.
See infra Part III.

18.

See infra PartIV.

19. See infra PartIV.
20.

See infra PartIV.

21. See infra notes 117-24 and accompanying text.
22.

See infra Part III.

23.
24.
25.
26.

See infra Part III.
See infra notes 141-47 and accompanying text.
See infra Part III.
See infra Part IV.
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Part V makes this importance clear by discussing how casting
privacy in this way means that people have a greater right to privacy
because, in essence, the reasonable expectations of the violated party can
be used as the basis for disallowing tech titans from profiting off the acts
and communications of others.2 7 However, that does not necessarily
mean that we will enjoy more privacy. 28 A property right of this kind
will depend on people's expectations-and a survey of students
performed in 2019 indicated that people do not necessarily expect
privacy. 29 The erosion of our rights, then, can feasibly be used to justify
the continued erosion of those very rights. 30 As such, Part V concludes
with a general conversation about some statutory or regulatory measures
that could conceivably empower people enough to again stimulate
expectations of privacy sufficient, hopefully, to clarify the right to not be
spied upon for profit anymore. 31
II.

CURRENT PRIVACY ISSUES

I suppose it has become de rigueur to note just how little privacy
we have in today's world. To me, the most amazing example of this is
Amazon's Alexa product and its ilk.32 The brazenness of this device's
spying is matched only by its breadth: it literally listens to every single
33
word said within earshot, never pausing, never stopping. Its sole
purpose, in fact, is to listen in on you at all times, ostensibly awaiting
34
some command related to the current weather or a favorite song.
People put these in their kitchens, in their bathrooms, next to their
showers, even in their kids' rooms. 35 And can anyone really say how
much it overhears? What it does with what it hears? How many lists it
compiles and to whom it sells those lists? Does anyone know? Does

27.

See infra Part V.

28. See infra Part V.
29. See infra Part V.A.
30.

See infra Part V.A.

31. See infra Part V.B.
32. See What Is Alexa?, AMAZON ALEXA, https://developer.amazon.com/en-US/alexa (last
visited Aug. 1, 2021) ("Alexa is Amazon's cloud-based voice service available on hundreds of
millions of devices from Amazon and third-party device manufacturers. With Alexa, you can build
natural voice experiences that offer customers a more intuitive way to interact with the technology
they use every day.").
33.

Grant Clauser, Amazon's Alexa Never Stops Listening to You. Should You Worry?,

WIRECUTER (Aug. 8, 2019), https://www.nytimes.com/wirecutter/blog/amazons-alexa-neverstops-listening-to-you.
34. See id.
35. See id.
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anyone care? It seems not, given the ubiquity of these devices. 36 Can
anyone honestly imagine that you would have permitted one of the
world's largest companies to plant literal listening devices throughout
your home without any explicit constraint on how that company uses
what it hears (or perhaps, who knows, even sees)?37 I think not. And,
yet, here we are-daily, hourly, moment-to-moment actively welcoming
the destruction of a level of intimate privacy that was thought sacrosanct
virtually minutes ago, it seems.
And, of course, the list goes on. In the case of Conditi v. Instagram,
LLC, a consumer filed a class action suit against Instagram, a subsidiary
of Facebook, alleging violations of the California Consumer Privacy
Act, the California Unfair Competition Law, and the federal Wiretap
Act-Title 1 of the Electronic Communications Privacy Act
("ECPA"). 38 Her complaint alleged that Instagram, since 2010, had
accessed the cameras on users' phones even when the app was not in
use. 39 Instagram terms and conditions only give the company limited
access, particularly, while the app is in use. 40 The company, without user
consent, captured information through the camera and transmitted it to
the company for business uses, including targeted advertisements.41 This
camera access intercepted the oral communications occurring when
users were not in the Instagram app, without consent. 42
In Campbell v. Facebook, Inc.,4 Matthew Campbell sued Facebook
over its use of Facebook private messages to gain information from
users, information which was compiled and sold to advertisers for
36. An analysis done by Consumer Intelligence Research Partners, LLC "indicates that the
US installed base of smart speaker devices is 76 million units," as of August 2019. Michael R.
Levin & Joshua N. Lowitz, Smart Speaker Market Shows Continued Growth, CONSUMER INTEL.

RScH. PARTNERS (Aug. 8, 2019), https://46bal23xc93a3571c1ltqhds-wpengine.netdna-ssl.com/wpcontent/uploads/2019/08/cirp-news-release-2019-08-08-smart-speakers.pdf. And it only gets better.
In February 2021,
Amazon announced Alexa Custom Assistant, a new service that lets device makers, auto
makers, and service providers create custom-branded voice assistants that are powered
by and work in cooperation with Alexa. The Alexa Custom Assistant can be built into
automobiles and consumer electronics, including smart displays, speakers, set top boxes,
fitness devices, and more ....
Amazon.com Announces Financial Results and CEO Transition, BUS. WIRE (Feb. 2, 2021),
https://s2.q4cdn.com/299287126/files/docfinancials/2020/q4/Amazon-Q4-2020-EamingsRelease.pdf.
37.

See Clauser, supra note 33.

38. Class Action Complaint & Jury Trial Demanded, Conditi v. Instagram, LLC., No. 3:20cv-06534-AGT, at 4, 9-10, 22, 24 (N.D. Cal. Sept. 17, 2020).
39. Id. at 3-7.
40. Id. at 1-2.
41. Id. at 6-8.
42. Id. at 25.
43. 77 F. Supp. 3d 836 (N.D. Cal. 2014).
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production of "targeted ads."' Plaintiff alleged that Facebook
intercepted the messages and took scans of them, searching for URLs to
45
Facebook private messages, as
understand a user's preferences.
described on the website, were purportedly meant to protect private
conversations, and the only ones to know of the contents were the sender
47
and receiver. 46 Facebook and plaintiffs settled the case.
In yet another case dealing with the Facebook Empire, Davis v.
4t
Facebook, Inc. (In re Facebook, Inc. Internet Tracking Litigation),
plaintiffs (Facebook users) alleged violations of various federal statutes,
claiming that the company continued to track users' personal
information even after they had logged off the social media platform,
using plug-ins to track users' browsing histories when they visited other
websites. 49 This was done without users' knowledge or consent, meaning
Facebook intercepted the communications between the user and first
party website (the URL request from the user to the website) and could
examine what type of content the website contained and how long a user
stayed there.50 This also meant that Facebook had access to users'
browsing history, using this information to compile personal profiles for
sale to the highest bidders.5
Albeit focusing on a different evil empire, the case of Brown v.
Google, LLC,52 sounds much the same. Google has a private browsing
option that purports to prevent the company from tracking browsing
history, IP addresses, what a user is viewing, and details about a user's
hardware.53 Plaintiffs filed a class action complaint alleging, however,
that Google continued intercepting users' private personal data including
URL requests, webpage browsing history, search queries, and

44. Id. at 838-39. "Targeted advertising is a form of online advertising" that is directed to the
individual based on his "specific traits, interests, and preferences." What Is Targeted Advertising?,
GCFGLOBAL, https://edu.gcfglobal.org/en/thenow/what-is-targeted-advertising/l (last visited Aug.
1, 2021). Advertisers acquire consumers' information by tracking their activity on the internet,
which can be done by viewing saved cookies that are associated with online searches, checking
search engine history, and finding personal information on social media. See id.
45. Campbell, 77 F. Supp. 3d at 840.
46. See id. at 838-39.
47. Ashwini Bharatkumar, Campbell v. Facebook: California DistrictJudge Approves Final
Class Action Settlement Over Facebook's Use of URL Data, JOLT DiG. (Mar. 7, 2018),
https://jolt.law.harvard.edu/digest/campbell-v-facebook-california-district-judge-approves-finalclass-action-settlement-over-facebooks-use-of-url-data.
48. 956 F.3d 589 (9th Cir. 2020).
49. Id. at 596-97.
50. Id. at 596.
51. Id. at 596, 601.
52. No. 20-CV-03664-LHK, 2021 WL 949372 (N.D. Cal. Mar. 12, 2021).
53. Id. at *34.

https://scholarlycommons.law.hofstra.edu/hlr/vol49/iss4/5

6

Pomeroy: If You Don't Care, Who Will?
2021 ]

IF YOU DON'T CARE, WHO WILL?

1021

geolocation, without their consent.5 4 While the search engine would not
track the data, Google Analytics, Google Ad Manager, and other apps
and plug-ins continued recording the data.55 After intercepting the
communications between a user and a website, Google then used the
data acquired by violating the ECPA. 56
Apparently not content with that kind of behavior, Google's
subsidiary, YouTube, was the subject of a civil action in Federal Trade
Commission v. Google, LLC.57 There, the Federal Trade Commission
brought a Children's Online Privacy Protection Act ("COPPA")
complaint against the company, alleging that, beginning in 2016,
YouTube gave content creators on their platform the option to use
behavioral advertising. 58 YouTube collected data to conduct its
behavioral advertising to target ads based in part on the type of video
content a YouTube user searched and viewed. 59 YouTube hosted several
child-directed channels, with content popular among children relating to
toys, movies, and cartoons.60 As an owner of a website classified as
"child directed," YouTube had a duty under COPPA to obtain parental
permission before collecting personal information from children, but it
failed to adequately ensure the children's parents gave verifiable consent
and failed to give notice that the information was used to target
advertisements to children based on the personal information and
communications gathered. 61
Of course, it is not just the tech colossi that violate you (and your
children's) privacy. In the case of Ducharme v. Madewell Concrete,
LLC,62 for example, an employee brought a complaint against his
company alleging violations of the Stored Communications Act. 63 As
part of his employment, the company provided an iPad for work, which
he occasionally used to log into his personal email account. 4 The
company filed suit against the employee after he left its employ, using a
screenshot from the iPad in the case against him. 65 That screenshot,
however, showed an email from plaintiff's personal email account,
54. Id. at *1-2.
55. Id.
56. Id. at*14.
57. Complaint for Permanent Injunction, Civil Penalties, & Other Equitable Relief, Fed.
Trade Comm'n v. Google, L.L.C., No. 1:19-cv-02642 (D.D.C. Sept. 4, 2019).
58. Id. at 1, 7.
59. Id. at 7-10.
60. Id. at 10-11.
61. See id. at 14-16.
62. No. 6:20-1620-HMH, 2020 WL 4043646 (D.S.C. July 17, 2020).
63. Id. at *1.
64. Id.
65. Id.
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meaning the company had accessed his stored electronic information
without his knowledge or consent."
It is also not just companies who can take advantage of our online
lives and activities to violate our privacy in ways that would have been
unimaginable just a few years ago. In A Vast Web of Vengeance, author
Kashmir Hill details the extent to which an individual armed with
nothing more than spite and access to publicly available computers can
67
ruin the reputations and lives of countless people. Therein, Ms. Hill
details the activities of a Canadian woman named Nadire Atas, who has
68
posted about numerous individuals with whom she has been in conflict.
These posts-alleging fraud, illegal activity, and pedophilia-once
69
Whether posted on "reputation
online, seemingly exist forever.
websites" like the Ripoff Report or simply available as random blog
posts, these claims and descriptions seep into the background structure
of the internet, difficult-to-impossible to remove, and forever stain the
70
reputation and privacy of its targets. Though not as direct as some of
the above examples, this is no less a terrifying example of how little
control we have over formerly private aspects of personhood like
7
reputation and community perception.
And when we say "privacy," it is not just our photos and secrets
and innermost thoughts at issue. We also mean the right to participate in
an open and free democratic system that is not lorded over by secret
gate-keepers utilizing unknowable algorithms and formulae to decide
72
who gets to speak out and who does not. This was made explicit when
the same old group of tech companies banned President Trump, in
unison, in January 2021.73 This provoked a wide variety of world
66. See id. For a discussion on the dangers of employers violating the wiretap Act and the
Stored Communications Act, see Kara K. Trowell, Monitoring Employee Electronic
Communications:A Potentially Risky Business Decision?, DAVIS WRIGHT TREMAINE LLP (July 2,
https://www.dwt.com/blogs/privacy-security-law-blog/2020/07/privacy-concerns2020),
monitoring-employee-communication. In this blog post, Ms. Trowell notes employers should craft
company policies requiring employees to consent to electronic monitoring to circumvent the
Wiretap Act. Id. For the Stored Communications Act, she suggests either exclusively using
employer provided communication services coupled with a disclosure of data retention policy or
employees' consent to obtain communications from their private sources. Id.
67. Kashmir Hill, A Vast Web of Vengeance, N.Y. TIMES (Feb. 2, 2021),
https://www.nytimes.com/2021/01/30/technology/change-my-google-results.html.
68. Id.
69. See id.
70. See id.
71. See id. The author Kashmir Hill notes, at the end of her article, that Ms. Atas, having
become confrontational during conversations, apparently began to post online demeaning and false
things about Hill and her husband. Id.
72. See Bokhari, supra note 6.
73. Id.
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leaders-many (maybe most) of whom did not agree with Trump's
policies-to speak out.74
None of them liked "the idea that a pack of American hipsters in
Silicon Valley can, at any moment, cut off their digital lines of
communication." 5 The Web was set up, initially, to accommodate a free
flow of ideas and to permit unshackled speech, owned by no one. 76 But
that has now been subverted, given the incredible power and reach of a
relatively small number of companies, which has monetized and
capitalized speech, which monitors thoughts and trends, and which
openly manipulates public behavior and electoral processes.7 7 Whatever
you think of the politics involved, this is ultimately a deep intrusion into
a normal public discourse. By intercepting in between open speech and
open behavior, these companies have, yet again, lessened the ability of
people to speak openly and freely and chipped away, ever more, at
privacy rights and norms. 78
Again, these are simply a few random samples and thoughts
regarding the increasing destruction of privacy. With a few days looking
by a research assistant, this list could easily be expanded in terms of
breadth and type. 79 The overarching point is that our lives are online and
they are no longer our own.
III.

HISTORICAL CONCEPTS OF PRIVACY RIGHTS 80

This loss of privacy does not exist in a vacuum. The right to privacy
is a longstanding human concern.8 1 Indeed, it is not too strong to say that

74. See id. ("Socialists, conservatives, nationalists, neoliberals, autocrats, and anti-autocrats
may not agree on much, but they all recognize that the tech giants have accumulated far too much
power."). It is appropriate, I suppose, that this condemnation came from outside America, given that
the core remedial scheme I will ultimately recommend also comes from other shores. See infra Part
IV.B. There is apparently a relatively high level of acceptance of online violation or technocratic
control incipient in American culture and society. Whether that is due to America's position as the
source of much of the technology at issue or some aspect of our national psyche (perhaps echoed by
endless reality television shows), I do not know. But it seems rather stark, and, indeed, I do not
think this Article would be necessary if American citizens maintained an even remotely historical
sense of self, privacy, and distance.
75. Bokhari, supra note 6.
76. Id.
77. See id.
78. See id.
79. See, e.g., Merrill v. Curry, No. 05-19-01229-CV, 2020 WL 6498983, at *1 (Tex. App.
Nov. 5, 2020) ("Merrill sued McKinney Independent School District administrators . .. alleging
they improperly used unauthorized nude photographs of her that were posted and sent to them by
her ex-fianc6 to force her to resign her position as teacher.").
80.

Much of the material herein is taken from an earlier Article of mine, Pomeroy, supra note

3, at 279-82.

Published by Scholarly Commons at Hofstra Law, 2021

9

Hofstra Law Review, Vol. 49, Iss. 4 [2021], Art. 5

1024

HOFSTRA LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 49:1015

82
privacy is a core part of who we all are. Historically, it was not so
difficult or challenging a concept, given how little exposure most people
had to other people.83 But, of course, this has changed over time and is
now a very important concern and issue.
Before focusing on the issue itself, though, it is perhaps helpful to
take a moment to examine and think about the protections the legal
system has traditionally provided when it comes to privacy. From there,
given the content of this Article, it is helpful to analyze those traditional
protections in the context of our contemporary tech-centric problems and
to think about the extent to which the old matches up with the challenges
of the new. This should, in theory, aid us in understanding how it is that
we have ended up in our current privacy desert.
This historical review is more difficult than it initially seems,
though, because the American judiciary has historically struggled to
define "privacy" and to specify what "right to privacy" each individual
possesses. 8 4 So, it is certainly true that "[t]hroughout history, human

81. See, e.g., TERRY HALBERT & ELAINE INGULLI, LAW & ETHICS IN THE BUSINESS
ENVIRONMENT 87-93 (8th ed. 2015) (discussing the value of privacy and the tension between that
value and the modern workplace). "In democratic societies there is a fundamental belief in the

uniqueness of the individual, in his basic dignity and worth as a creature of God and a human being,
and in the need to maintain social processes that safeguard his sacred individuality." ALAN F.
WESTIN, PRIVACY AND FREEDOM 33 (1967). There is a "core self" that can be pictured as an inner

circle encompassed by larger circles. See id. These circles represent an inner core that shelters one's
"hopes, fears, and prayers," radiating out to less personal-but nevertheless important-aspects of
one's self that we all desire to keep private. See id. "The most serious threat," in fact, "to the
individual's autonomy is the possibility that someone may penetrate the inner zone and learn his
ultimate secrets, either by physical or psychological means." Id. This is so important because
[e]ach person is aware of the gap between what he wants to be and what he actually is,
between what the world sees of him and what he knows to be his much more complex
reality. In addition, there are aspects of himself that the individual does not fully
understand but is slowly exploring and shaping as he develops. Every individual lives
behind a mask in this manner ....
Id.
82. Or, at least, the right to privacy is a core part of who we are. It is the ability, it seems to
me, to decide how much of oneself to reveal that is so important, so intrinsic to our personhood.
Obviously, you will reveal more of yourself to a spouse, a child, or a close friend than to a stranger.
And, of course, you will reveal different parts of yourself even to different parts of your inner circle,
and even to the same person at different times. That is really what privacy is-the dynamic, variable
ability to decide who gets to know certain things about you. It is no less than self-determination.
83. The number of people you know or have come into contact with, for instance, is likely
vastly higher than that of your grandparents or great grandparents, particularly if you define contact
as the people you are exposed to (or who are exposed to you) online.
84. See Lance E. Rothenberg, Comment, Re-thinking Privacy: Peeping Toms, Video Voyeurs,
and the Failureof Criminal Law to Recognize a Reasonable Expectation of Privacy in the Public
Space, 49 AM. U. L. REv. 1127,1132-33 (2000).
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beings have always recognized a concept of privacy,"8 5 but just what
that means has not always been clear. 86
Some clarity was provided in 1890 "when Samuel Warren and
Louis Brandeis drafted the blueprints for a new tort." 87 This newly
articulated tort protecting a legal right to privacy, protecting against an
invasion of privacy, went beyond trust, contract, and property theories
and instead stood alone, stemming from an individual's "inviolate

personality."88
Part of the difficulty in understanding these sorts of rights, though,
is that the very concept of privacy is relative, so the definition of privacy
must fit within the ambit of what society is willing to condone. 89 There
is, after all, a very big difference between saying that you have a right to
exclude paparazzi from your shower and saying that you have a right to
exclude the police from your basement drug-cooking operations. And, of
course, this is where much of the theoretical heft of this Article is
directed-in thinking through why it is that historical privacy norms
(whether perfect or not, presumably they covered a significant chunk of
important activity) have, more or less, failed entirely to cover
contemporary privacy needs.90

85.

Id. at 1132 (citing MCLEAN, supra note 10, at 3, 9).

86.

For many years, the "right to be let alone" seemed to vaguely encapsulate the concept. Id.

at 1132-33; see also THOMAS M. COOLEY, A TREATISE ON THE LAW OF TORTS OR THE WRONGS
WHICH ARISE INDEPENDENT OF CONTRACT 29 (2d ed. 1890) (contextualizing the right "to be let
alone" in terms of tort law); Peter P. Swire, Peeping, 24 BERKELEY TECH. L.J. 1167, 1176 n.49
(2009) (setting forth numerous sources discussing the protections afforded to privacy rights under
the English common law).
87. Rothenberg, supra note 84, at 1133 (citing Samuel D. Warren & Louis D. Brandeis, The
Right to Privacy, 4 HARV. L. REV. 193, 219 (1890)). Prior to this, "Peeping Tom crimes were
unknown" under the common law. Lisa F. Wu, Peeping Tom Crimes, 28 PAC. L.J. 705, 705 (1997).
The Article by Warren and Brandeis marked the American beginning of legal protection from
various types of intrusion on a person's seclusion. See id. at 707. Interestingly, their interest in a tort
for invasion of privacy allegedly stemmed from embarrassing press coverage of the wedding party
of one of Warren's daughters. Id. at 707 (citing William L. Prosser, Privacy, 48 CALIF. L. REV. 383,
383 (1960)).
88. Rothenberg, supra note 84, at 1133-34 (quoting Warren & Brandeis, supra note 87, at
205). This ideal of an "inviolate personality" has been described "as a condition and right that is
essentially tied to human dignity, the principle of equal respect for persons, and the notion of
personhood itself." Richard C. Turkington, Legacy of the Warren and Brandeis Article: The
Emerging UnencumberedConstitutionalRight to InformationalPrivacy, 10 N. ILL. U. L. REV. 479,

484 (1990). But see Ken Gormley, One Hundred Years of Privacy, 1992 wIS. L. REV. 1335, 1343
(1992) (indicating that the "[b]asic kernels of privacy" relate back to the common law crimes of
trespass, assault, and battery).
89.

"Since the latter part of the twentieth century, the critical determinant of whether a person

has a right to privacy is whether that person has a reasonable expectation of privacy in the situation
at hand." Robert Sprague, Orwell Was an Optimist: The Evolution of Privacy in the United States
andIts De-Evolutionfor American Employees, 42 J. MARSHALL L. REV. 83, 133 (2008).

90. See infra notes 151-55 and accompanying text.
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That said, privacy needs to be deconstructed to really be understood
or critiqued. Fortunately, "[s]eventy years [after Warren and Brandeis's
Article], this concept of invasion of privacy was broken down into four
91
The four areas of
separate torts by Dean William L. Prosser."
protection "consist of the following: (1) [i]ntrusion upon one's seclusion,
(2) public disclosure of private facts, (3) publicity placing a person in
92
false light, and (4) misappropriation of a person's name or likeness."
This list is as interesting for what it is not as for what it is. What it
93
is not is a list that even contemplates an online world. That said, I do
think the first area of protection, regarding observing people where they
expect not to be observed, or intruding upon their seclusion, is perhaps
the most potentially relevant. 94 Looking at people when they wish to
remain unseen is a kind of "peeping" not generally permitted under the
95
law, and "[t]he simplest form of peeping is merely to look." "Just
looking" is a deceptively innocuous action that has long had significant
legal and cultural implications, and the tort of intrusion grows out of this
concern.96 This tort includes three elements: first, there is an intrusion;
second, that intrusion is offensive to a reasonable person; and third, the
97
plaintiff had a reasonable expectation of privacy.
These elements probably seem fairly intuitive to most of us: most
of us probably think that the law should protect us against unreasonable,
impermissible observation. And several early examples seem to confirm
this intuition.98 These examples include "an instance where one looked
into windows through elevated railways, and also one in which a
detective spied into windows." 99 Most of us would expect privacy while
100
in our own homes, and that is what these cases protect.
Of course, as technology changes, so do society's requirements and
101
Almost immediately upon
the pressures put upon traditional rights.

91. Wu, supra note 87, at 707.
92. Id. (citing Prosser, supra note 87, at 389).
93. Of course, that is not surprising, given when it was developed-but it is striking,
nonetheless, given the extent to which human interaction now revolves around online fora.
94. See Elements of an Intrusion Claim, DIGrr. MEDIA L. PROJECT (Jan. 22, 2021),
https://www.dmlp.org/legal-guide/elements-intrusion-claim ("An intrusion on seclusion claim is a
special form of invasion of privacy. It applies when someone intentionally intrudes, physically or
otherwise, upon the solitude or seclusion of another.").
95. Swire, supra note 86, at 1173-74.
96. See id. at 1174-75.
97. Wu, supra note 87, at 707.
98. See id. at 708.
99. Id. (citing Moore v. N.Y. Elevated R.R., 29 N.E. 997, 998 (N.Y. 1892); Souder v.
Pendleton Detectives, Inc., 88 So. 2d 716, 718 (La. Ct. App. 1956)).
100. See id.
101. See id.
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their invention and widespread adoption, for instance, videotaping and
photographing became a means to intrude upon privacy.10 2 Courts
adapted quickly, and, though they have been reluctant to rule that
videotaping and photographing constitute intrusions of privacy when
they occur in a public place, they have not hesitated to do so when such
observation occurs where the person has a reasonable expectation of
privacy. 0 3
Courts have not, however, similarly adapted to online voyeurism.10 4
Though one can make the argument that following someone's online
activities, selling their private information, or monitoring their purchases
is a kind of "peeping," we have not seen great strides in expanding the
tort of intrusion to online activity.' 0 5
I think this is due to the logical and intuitive heft of the latter two
elements of intrusion, mentioned above (that the intrusion must be
offensive to a reasonable person and that the plaintiff must have had a
reasonable expectation of privacy).106 The focus on reasonableness and
expectations is similar to many torts and, being tort-based, is reflexively
focused on one's perceptions of circumstance and the behavior of
others.1 07 That is, the extent to which conduct is ultimately found to meet

102. See id.
103. Many cases have so held, and a few examples quickly make the point. See, e.g., Miller v.
Nat'l Broad. Co., 232 Cal. Rptr. 668, 678-79 (Cal. Ct. App. 1986). In that case, a TV news crew
filmed a man in his home as he was having a heart attack. Id. at 670. The court found liability, based
upon intrusion. Id. at 679. In another case, several underaged fashion models who were secretly
videotaped in their dressing area by security guards later recovered against the guards' employer
under a cause of action for invasion of privacy. Doe v. B.P.S. Guard Servs., Inc., 945 F.2d 1422,
1423 (8th Cir. 1991). Finally, in a different case, a woman who had been taped while using a
tanning bed ultimately recovered punitive damages. Miller v. Willis, No. 92AP-1410, 1993 WL
76303, at *1, *3 (Ohio Ct. App. Feb. 16, 1993). In this context, then, the courts have not had any
difficulty understanding the advancements in surveillance made available due to video technology
and how those advancements affect historical concepts of privacy.

104. See Rothenberg, supra note 84, at 1135-38 ("[T]he video voyeur blatantly defies ... [the]
legitimate desire for privacy by utilizing technology to observe, record, and often to disseminate
images of the very acts and body parts that were never intended or reasonably assumed to be open
to public inspection.").
105. See id.
106. See supra note 97 and accompanying text.
107. This includes, without limitation, the torts of negligence, Univ. of Tex. M.D. Anderson
Cancer Ctr. v. McKenzie, 578 S.W.3d 506, 518-19 (Tex. 2019) (stating that, in a negligence action,
foreseeability means that "the actor should have reasonably anticipated the dangers that his
negligent conduct created for others"); nuisance, Crosstex N. Tex. Pipeline, L.P. v. Gardiner, 505

S.W.3d 580, 596 n.9 (Tex. 2016) (stating that in a nuisance action, the relevant question is whether
the defendant's actions unreasonably hindered the plaintiff's use and enjoyment); assault, Sanchez
v. Striever, 614 S.W.3d 233, 239 (Tex. App. 2020) (stating that a person commits an assault if "the
person intentionally or knowingly causes physical contact with another when the person knows or
should reasonably believe that the other will regard the contact as offensive or provocative");

defamation, Diocese of Lubbock v. Guerrero, 591 S.W.3d 244, 250-51 (Tex. App. 2019) (stating
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these elements (and so constitute the tort of intrusion) is driven primarily
108
by the extent to which the conduct seems objectively objectionable.
Courts-and society-ask whether something seems strange, bizarre, or
weird. 109 We look outside ourselves and ask how society views our inner
life or personal actions. This is, then, a fundamentally outward facing
view of rights, dependent on what society, as a whole, thinks is
reasonable or normal, and the behavior of others within the context of
that normality (or lack thereof). 10
This is in contrast to an inward looking, inherent view of rights."'
Under this kind of view, a right is a more concrete thing, less subject to
the vagaries of social views or pressures." 2 It is a legal ability or power
that is broadcast to the world and to which the world must react. In this
sense, it is possibly more subjective, as it is not as variable, and can, in
some ways, be defined by the individual because, once so defined, it
exists and must be reacted to." 3
I think that privacy has historically been viewed through the lens of
the former because most privacy-violating acts have historically been
4
easily understood as observably outrageous, or weird, behavior."
Ultimately, though, I think the latter view of privacy is more correct and
healthy and would cover a wider variety of activity that, though
historically not bizarre, would likely be viewed by most reasonable
people as a violation of what most of us understand as our privacy rights.

that whether a publication is defamatory depends on a reasonable person's view of the publication
as a whole"); negligent infliction of emotional distress, Carrol v. Allstate Ins. Co., 815 A.2d 119,
128 (Conn. 2003) (stating that a person negligently inflicts emotional distress if the fear experienced
by the plaintiffs is reasonable compared to the acts of the defendants); and professional malpractice,
Rogers v. Zanetti, 518 S.W.3d 394, 406 (Tex. 2017) (stating that in a malpractice action, "the risk
associated with a trial tactic speaks to what a reasonably prudent lawyer would do under similar
circumstances"). It does not appear too strong a claim to state that tort law is substantially
constructed upon the concept of reasonableness.
108. See Prosser, supra note 87, at 390-91.
109. See, e.g., Wood v. Hustler Mag., Inc., 736 F.2d 1084, 1085-86 (5th Cir. 1984) (finding an
invasion of privacy when neighbors broke into Wood's home, stole a nude photo, and forged a
consent form for Hustler Magazine to publish); Patel v. Hussain, 485 S.W.3d 153, 176-77 (Tex.
App. 2016) (stating that Patel not only sent Nadia a text message threatening to play Nadia's private
video during a mutual friend's wedding, but also frequently sent offensive messages, hacked into
her accounts, and uploaded the secretly recorded videos to the web); Merrill v. Curry,
No. 05-19-01229-CV, 2020 WL 6498983, at *1-2 (Tex. App. Nov. 5, 2020) (involving public
school administrators who took a nude photo from emails and enlarged the photo on an oversized
computer monitor during a private employment meeting).
110. See Prosser, supra note 87, at 390-91.
111.

See Nicholas Wolterstorff, Justice as Inherent Rights: A Response to My Commentators,

37 J. RELIGIOUS ETHICS 261, 263 (2009).
112. See id.
113. See id.
114. See supranotes 108-09 and accompanying text.
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In essence, what I am arguing is that privacy really is an in rem rightand that, ultimately, it is one we are actively abandoning.1 5 Viewing
privacy in this fashion squares the circle of why we have an invasion of
privacy tort, but live in a world where virtually anything we do or say
(most of which occurs online) does not belong to us and is fair game for
companies and third parties to pilfer and profit from.
IV.

PRIVACY AS PROPERTY'

16

As indicated above, property law focuses on the thing and the rights
flowing from that thing."' This means that third parties have to expend
time and resources to learn the attributes of these rights, rather than
requiring the rights-claimant to advertise or take on the burden of
informing others of their right.11 8 Because it focuses on the corporeal
thing, this theory of cost can be said to flow from the in rem, as opposed
to the in personam, nature of property.1 9 This is inherent in
115. I am largely focusing on the common law, though I think the same can be said of statutory
and regulatory law, as well, though there are a number of (again) arguably relevant statutes out
there. "The Electronic Communications Privacy Act and the Stored wire Electronic
Communications Act are commonly referred together as the Electronic Communications Privacy
Act (ECPA) of 1986," for example. Electronic Communications Privacy Act of 1986 (ECPA), BJA,
https://bja.ojp.gov/program/it/privacy-civil-liberties/authorities/statutes/1285 (last visited Aug. 1,
2021). According to the United States Department of Justice, the Electronic Communications
Privacy Act ("ECPA") applies to "wire, oral, and electronic communications" that are transmitted or
stored in a computer. Id. These include emails, phone calls, and electronically stored data. Id. Title I
of the ECPA, also known as the Wiretap Act, prohibits intentional actual or attempted interception,
use, disclosure, or procurement of any wire, oral, or electronic communication. Electronic
Communications Privacy Act of 1986, 18 U.S.C. § 2511. The Wiretap Act has exceptions for
operators and service providers for uses in the ordinary course of business necessary to providing
the service. Id. Title II of the ECPA, also known as the Stored Communications Act, protects the
contents of electronically stored information when the information is stored by service providers.
Electronic Communications Privacy Act of 1986, 18 U.S.C. §§ 2701-2702. The contents protected
include subscriber name, billing records, or IP addresses. Electronic Communications PrivacyAct of
1986 (ECPA), supra. These federal provisions represent the backbone of electronic privacy claims,
but, again, they do not apply squarely to the kinds of issues at hand. Similarly, the Children's Online
Privacy Protection Act, specifically focused on children, protects the private personal information of
children under the age of thirteen. Children's Online Privacy Protection Act, 15 U.S.C. §§ 65016502. The Act requires companies to acquire the consent of parents to collect this type of personal
information from their children. Id. § 6502. Personal information includes name, address, IP
address, and browsing history. See id. § 6501. This statute seems relatively muscular, in this
context, but irredeemably narrow.

116. Much of the material herein is taken from an earlier article of mine, Chad J. Pomeroy, The
Shape of Property, 44 SETON HALL L. REv. 797, 806-10 (2014).
117. Thomas W. Merrill & Henry E. Smith, What Happened to Property in Law and
Economics?, 111 YALE L.J. 357, 360 (2001).
118. Unusual property rights increase the cost of doing this. I have previously written about
this view of property, in the context of the numerus, on a number of occasions. See, e.g., Pomeroy,
supra note 5, at 525-30.

119.

Merrill & Smith, supra note 117, at 360.

Published by Scholarly Commons at Hofstra Law, 2021

15

Hofstra Law Review, Vol. 49, Iss. 4 [2021], Art. 5
HOFSTRA LAW REVIEW

1030

[Vol. 49:1015

Blackstone's famous definition of property: "that sole and despotic
dominion which one man claims and exercises over the external things
of the world, in total exclusion of the right of any other individual in the
universe."12 o
This view of property rights focusing upon the thing itself means
that rights are defined with respect to an actual, concrete thing that is
possessed or owned (as opposed to being defined with respect to the
actors or individuals involved). 12 ' This, in turn, means that property
effectively broadcasts the rights and obligations inherent therein to "the
world."12 2 And that acts to create a duty in "everyone else" to understand
what is being broadcast.123
In
order
to
avoid
violating
another's
property
rights,
[individuals] . . . must ascertain what those rights are. In order to
acquire property rights, [individuals] must measure various attributes,
ranging from the physical boundaries of a parcel, to use rights, to the
24
attendant liabilities of the owner to others (such as adjacent owners).1

I think this would be a much healthier approach to something like
privacy rights in our modern world. Ironically, perhaps, I think this is so
because privacy is so innately ephemeral.1 25 Corporeal things are,
obviously, identifiable-a box is a box, a car is a car, your property book
12 6
There is no
is your property book, and Blackacre is Blackacre.
disconnect between how I see a car and how you see a car (at least, not
in the context of recognizing it as a thing that is ownable). And yet, even
in that overt context, property law still functions in terms of in rem
28
rights.1 27 Privacy obviously is not a corporeal thing1 -but, rather than

120.

2 WILLIAM BLACKSTONE, COMMENTARIES ON THE LAWS OF ENGLAND 2 (1992).

121. This is a traditional view of property, also relied on by Adam Smith and Jeremy Bentham,
which is in contrast with a more recent view of property rights as a malleable "bundle of rights."
CompareADAM SMITH, LECTURES ON JURISPRUDENCE 9-10 (R. L. Meek et al. eds., 1978) (viewing

property rights as being focused upon the thing itself), and 2 JEREMY BENTHAM, THE LIMITS OF
JURISPRUDENCE DEFINED 164-65 (Greenwood Press Publishers 1970) (1945) (analyzing property
rights as being defined with respect to an actual, concrete thing), with Felix S. Cohen, Dialogue on
PrivateProperty, 9 RUTGERS L. REv. 357, 370-71 (1954) (examining property rights with respect to
other individuals involved).
122. Merrill & Smith, supra note 117, at 360.
123. Id. at 359.
124. See Thomas W. Merrill & Henry E. Smith, Optimal Standardization in the Law of
Property: The Numerus Clausus Principle, 110 YALE L.J. 1, 26 (2000).
125. MCLEAN, supra note 10, at 3-5.
126. Blackacre is "a fictitious piece of real property ... used in the study of property law."
https://www.merriamMERRIAM-WEBSTER,
Blackacre,
of
Definition
Legal
webster.com/legal/blackacre (last visited Aug. 1, 2021).
127. Merrill & Smith, supra note 124, at 32.
128. See MCLEAN, supra note 10, at 5.
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make an in rem view less important, I think it makes it more important:
privacy is less clear, less explicit. My view of what I want to happen to
pictures of my kids on vacation likely differs a lot from your view of
what you want to happen to pictures of your kids on vacation-much
more than our views of the cars we drove on that vacation would differ.
That said-even though we would differ on the precise contours of the
protections we want afforded to those pictures-most people would
certainly want some protections to attach. There are broadly acceptable
contours of privacy rights that most people can agree on, but even these
will not flourish if every manifestation of privacy depends upon
interpreting the acts of third parties on an ad hoc basis.129 In other words,
permitting an inherently variegated right like privacy to exist solely as it
is viewed by society at large is bound to end in its virtual elimination.13 0
An in rem kind of focus will result, then, in a far more secure
recognition of rights than a third-party or facts-and-circumstances focus
would.131 Now, one legitimate objection here is that doing so will result
in enormous burdens on third persons ("third persons," here, being
"everyone else").132 The problem, of course, is that an in rem focus
imposes burdens on everyone to know and understand others' rights
(indeed, that is the feature for which I am lauding it).133 Merrill and
Smith focused in on this informational burden in theorizing why the
American property law system has the numerus clausus.1 34 They claim

129. See Thomas W. Merrill & Henry E. Smith, The Property/ContractInterface, 101 COLUM.
L. REV. 773, 793-94 (2001) (explaining that in complex circumstances with many parties and
competing interests, an in rem strategy is necessary to avoid a "break down" of the regulatory
system).
130. A fairly clear parallel is the designation of intellectual property as "property." Ideas,
words, creative works-these are intangible things, as well, but are recognized as property, and so
bestowed with property rights. Of course, these did not much exist at common law either (with a
few exceptions) and so, the absence of "privacy rights" from the "property rights" realm is not
particularly surprising. See Pomeroy, supra note 5, at 526 (explaining that courts are resistant to

creating "different types of property" or "new interests" because "property law recognizes only a
limited number of property forms or types").
131. Merrill & Smith, supra note 129, at 792 (stating that an in rem strategy provides useful
social functions, such as "a basis for security of expectation[s]").
132. Id. at 795-96.
133. Merrill & Smith, supra note 124, at 26.
134. Id. at 24-26. Merrill and Smith make the point that what the numerus clausus is really
doing is making it easier on others to understand what is being broadcast about the ownership rights
of others in a particular thing:
There can be no harm in allowing the fullest latitude to men in binding themselves and
their representatives, that is, their assets real and personal, to answer in damages for
breach of their obligations. This tends to no mischief, and is a reasonable liberty to
bestow; but great detriment would arise and much confusion of rights if parties were
allowed to invent new modes of holding and enjoying real property, and to impress upon
their lands and tenements a peculiar character, which should follow them into all hands,
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that courts are concerned that new property interests will create
information costs for those third parties that are required by our in rem
system to perceive the rights being broadcast from all property.135
This is a significant concern for a number of reasons. The first
reason is inherent in communication-one must expend resources (incur
cost) in order to receive and correctly interpret communication, and
expanding the type or range of information being communicated (i.e.,
changing what rights are possible or potentially present by creating new
types of property) will necessarily increase that cost. 136
The second is the universality described above: the duty to
understand is not personal-it attaches to "everyone else" and is
necessary in order to permit people to clearly and efficiently perceive
property rights and obligations and to economically arrange their plans
accordingly. 137 Unfortunately, this universality, while helpful and
necessary, greatly amplifies the costs of communication because those
costs end up being applied both to interested parties and to third parties
who presumably have no need to understand the rights and
responsibilities of a given property owner or relating to a given piece of
real property.13 8
Property owners and those directly interested in a given piece of
property will not take adequate account of these third-party costs, so the
informational burden identified herein is only possible so long as

however remote. Every close, every messuage, might thus be held in several fashion; and
it would hardly be possible to know what rights the acquisition of any parcel conferred,
or what obligations it imposed.
Id. at 25-26 (quoting Keppell v. Bailey, 39 Eng. Rep. 1042, 1049 (Ch. 1834)).
135. See id. at 26.
136. See id. at 26-27.
137. See Cohen, supra note 121, at 359; Merrill & Smith, supra note 117, at 359.
138. See Cohen, supra note 121, at 359-61. Merrill and Smith posit a helpful example, which
seems to have been based, at least in part, on a more complex hypothetical set forth by Henry
Hansmann and Reinier Kraakman. See Merrill & Smith, supra note 124, at 27 (referencing Henry
Hansmann & Reinier Kraakman, Property, Contract, and Verification: The Numerus Clausus
Problem and the Divisibility of Rights, 31 J. LEGAL STUDIES S373, 5416-17 (2002)). Suppose that
many people own watches. Id. One of these people is A, who is the sole owner of one of the
watches and who wants to transfer some of his rights to use the watch to B. Id. The law permits the
creation of various types of estate in property: A could sell a fee, a life estate, or some sort of
concurrent interest. Id. But, instead of this, assume that A wants to create a time-share type of
interest in the watch, which would allow B to use the watch only on the 15th of each month. Id. If
this sort of "fancy" property right were permitted, then everyone else interested in buying a watch
(whether from A or from any other owner) would have to continually be on the lookout as to
whether or not the watch they were interested in had been carved up in this manner or in some other
unique manner. Id. Neither A nor B would care about this, as they would have accomplished their
purpose and would presumably have accounted for any marginal cost associated with a future sale.
Id. By foreclosing anything other than a standardized set of forms, then, property law forces parties
to effectively moderate the costs ultimately borne by "everyone else." Id.
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property remains simple and standardized, such that "everyone else" can
understand the broadcast easily and with little cost.139 This
standardization lowers the cost of determining the nature of the property
rights at issue and so economically benefits society as a whole. 4 0
Those seem like huge concerns in my suggestion that we view
privacy through an in rem lens. I think, however, that such concerns and
concepts actually run, counterintuitively, in the opposite direction-that
is, that they support the useability of such a focus, in this context. For,
while it is true that it is very difficult and costly to understand all rights
and obligations associated with all possible kinds of "property," when
that requirement to understand is imposed on everyone, our modern
privacy issues do not really revolve around "everyone." 14 1 Instead, they

139. See id. at 33. This point about third parties is central to Merrill and Smith's view of the
numerus clausus. See id. at 28. They focus on the informational asymmetry that arises due to the
fact that third parties have no connection with, or exposure to, the transaction wherein the unique
property interest is created. See id. Those connected with the transaction (that is, those who fall
within the "zone of privity") are able to account for the increased informational costs by

incorporating them (or an expectation of them) into the price they receive or pay, and such
immediate parties (or those within the "zone of privity" of the decision to create the fancy right)
could perhaps be just as effectively (and more easily) controlled or affected by a contractarian
approach with default rules that can be opted out of. See id. at 30-31. Those not so connected to the
transaction, however, do not have the knowledge or ability necessary to act in an informed manner.
See id. at 31. And it is that disconnect upon which Merrill and Smith focus-that fundamental
asymmetry of information that drives the numerus clausus as a mandatory rule of prohibition. See
id. Interestingly, that may well be (particularly given the amount of interest generated by Merrill
and Smith's writings on this matter), but that is not directly relevant to the point made by this
Article. The relevant point here is that, at least in the view of some, the numerus clausus exists in
order to counteract informational burdens created by new or unique property types. See id. at 38.
The extent to which those costs are borne by those outside the zone of privity is partially analogous,
but it is not necessary and does not directly drive the application of the numerus clausus to the
heterogeneity of vesting documents. Compare id. at 38, with Pomeroy, supra note 116, at 811-19. In
fact, taking it even a step further, the numerus clausus is arguably applicable here, regardless of
whether or not it directly turns on informational burdens. See Michael A. Heller, The Boundaries of
Private Property, 108 YALE L.J. 1163, 1176-78 (1999). Heller argues that the purpose of the
numerus clausus is to limit fragmentation of ownership and thus promote the easy transferability of
property rights. See id. This is not an informational burden and so is not as similar to the
heterogeneity cost identified above as is Merrill and Smith's cost. The numerus clausus would still
apply, however, as it still posits that property law should limit newness or uniqueness when doing
so would further an underlying goal of property law. Merrill & Smith, supra note 124, at 40.
140. See Merrill & Smith, supra note 124, at 33. This may lead to the conclusion that there is a
preferred balance as to the economically appropriatenumber of recognizable property forms. See id.
at 39-40. Some costs would be lowest in a fixed system that only recognizes a single type of
property interest. See id. "On the other hand, by grandfathering in existing forms of property, and
permitting legislative creation of new forms, the numerus clausus permits some positive level of

diversification in the recognized forms of property." Id. at 40. But see Pomeroy, supra note 116, at
807-19 (arguing that, perhaps, property law is not as much shaped by the type of informational
burden analysis propounded by Merrill and Smith as some have argued).
141.

See supra PartII.
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14 2
It is true
really only revolve around the technology whales of our day.
that, as much of our life has migrated online, the privacy ramifications
have multiplied exponentially and that these ramifications are felt, to
3
some degree, by everyone. 14 We all, as individuals, have choices to
make regarding others' online information and lives. However, by far,
the most pressing concerns really stem from the activities of a relatively
small number of companies." I do not purport to know the exact
number, but the basic oligarchy of tech titans is well known: Facebook,
145
These companies have an
Google, Amazon, Apple, Microsoft.
enormous level of connection to each of us-we communicate via them,
we share photos via them, we purchase via them, we invite them into our
homes to listen in on us at all times (literally), we use them to access the
14 6
Just read through Part II
internet and much of the outside world.
again, even briefly-almost every privacy issue raised there (and almost
every issue you can think of that is likely to present a legitimate threat to
your privacy) surrounds these (and perhaps a relatively modest number
of other) companies. 147
This is, in fact, excellent news. Without anticipating the solutions
discussed in Part V too much, 14 8 it suffices here to say that our privacy
can be protected if we all take a greater, more proprietary view of those
rights and that this, in turn, can be instigated by imposing some basic
obligations on the tech companies that have so much access to so much
private data. 149 Given that this access is so concentrated in the hands of
so few, this is a feasible and workable idea. But it must start with
150
convincing people that they do, in fact, own something.

V.

PRIVACY AS ABANDONED PROPERTY

The sum suggestion, to this point, then, is that privacy rights have
traditionally been viewed as an issue of tort, revolving around the acts of
others, but that this view is not equal to the task of protecting privacy in

142.
143.

See supra Part II.
See Bokhari, supra note 6.

144.

Tech Giants Do Not Face Enough Competition, New Report Says, PRIV. INT'L (Mar. 13,

https://privacyinternational.org/news-analysis/3736/tech-giants-do-not-face-enough2019),
competition-new-report-says.
145. Id.
146. See John Herrman, We're Stuck with the Tech Giants. But They're Stuck with Each Other,
N.Y. TIMES (Nov. 13, 2019), https://www.nytimes.com/interactive/2019/11/13/magazine/internetplatform.html.
147. See supra Part II.
148. See infra Part V.
149. See Bokhari, supra note 6.
150. See infra PartV.A.

https://scholarlycommons.law.hofstra.edu/hlr/vol49/iss4/5

20

Pomeroy: If You Don't Care, Who Will?

IF YOU DON'T CARE, WHO WILL?

2021 ]

1035

the modern age.151 Instead, privacy should be viewed as an in rem right,
as something we own that others must acknowledge and of which they
must take stock. 5 2 This will only help,1 53 though, if people recognize
these in rem rights and view them as valuable property worth protecting.
That is clearly not the case now, as a small survey, discussed below, that
I put out to my students makes clear. 5 4 There is, however, a solution to
this problem that can provoke a more proprietary view of privacy and so
usher in a better era of protection and rights.' 5 5
A.

The AbandonedBirthright

If we reconceptualize privacy as a property-type right that radiates
outward and must be understood and respected by others, then we go a
long way toward "fixing" the current status quo, wherein nobody
seemingly cares a whit for our inner selves or private thoughts.
However, what good is a property right if it is abandoned?
Abandonment of property is possible, within limits.156 In order to
establish abandonment, the owner must intend to relinquish all
ownership (with no intent that it go to a particular person) and there
must be a voluntary, affirmative act effectuating that intent. 57 This is an
analogous concept here because, even if you conceive of privacy rights
as property rights, it very much appears they have been abandoned. 5 8
In Fall 2019, I asked over 100 students to complete a questionnaire
attempting to assess their online behavior, their views on social media,
and their expectations of privacy.' 59 Ninety-three completed the survey.
The results are generally depressing.
First-in a surprise to no one-almost everyone uses the internet a
lot. Most people use social media multiple times per day, most people
use email multiple times per day, most people conduct internet searches

151. See supra Part III.
152. See supra Part IV.
153. By "help," I mean, encourage the acknowledgment and vitality of privacy rights in our
culture, at large.

154. See infra notes 160-66 and accompanying text.
155.

See infra Part V.B.

156. Real property cannot be abandoned. See DUKEMINIER ET AL., supra note 8, at 226, 229.
157. Id. at 225-26. (citing Hawkins v. Mahoney, 990 P.2d 776, 781 (Mont. 1999)).
158. Completing the analogy, abandoned property can be claimed by anyone. Id. at 225 (citing
Hawkins, 990 P.2d at 779). It is not too much a stretch to say that Facebook and its ilk have simply
come along and claimed the private information and data belonging to the millions (or billions) of
people who have abandoned it.
159. For the questions asked, and the responses received, see infra Appendix A.
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multiple times per day, and most people utilize a Global Positioning
1
System ("GPS") on a regular basis. 60
Second, most people have no real expectation of privacy when it
comes to this online activity. Three-quarters of the respondents expect
that the relevant service providers will be able to access the content that
they put online, and nearly as many (two-thirds) expect that even third
16 1
And, not
parties will be able to access the content that they put online.
only do people expect providers and strangers to access that content,
about 40% expect that those providers will be able to sell that content to
third parties. 162
So, if you conceive of privacy rights as an in rem-type of property
interest-that is, something that you own and that broadcasts out
obligations to third parties-then it is a property interest that has been
abandoned. People expect their online behavior to be observed and
monetized. 163 They do not expect or demand that their property be
respected or that the value that flows from it stay with them-they know
that providers and third parties are taking that data, using it, selling it,
and yet they continue to use these media on a near-constant basis.M
They have rights, but willingly give them up.
There is, perhaps, a slight silver lining in the survey. And that is the
last question. 165 Nearly 80% of the respondents indicated that they had
altered their privacy settings, based upon their belief that their privacy
was being invaded.1 66 That is good, in that it indicates that people do
care-which is enough, I think, to serve as a foundation for viewing
privacy as the property right it ought to be viewed as, and all of the
benefits that radiate out from that: if people care, then they will possibly
demand that others respect that about which they care. It is particularly
good news, too, in that it suggests a way to let people actively protect
their rights: by giving them simple tools to do so. If I can toggle a button
and prevent Facebook from selling photos of my kids to third-party
vendors, then I will do so-and so, apparently, will most people.

160. See infra Appendix A. If I were to repeat this survey, I think I would drill down on which
applications/websites people use the most and on the difference between people's perceptions of
email privacy and social media privacy. I suspect that people expect, and desire, more privacy when
it comes to email than to, say, Twitter. Given what I discuss below regarding how to inculcate a
sense of ownership in privacy rights, I think that existing expectation could perhaps serve as useful
information and perhaps as a sort of guidepost. See infra notes 163-66 and accompanying text.
161. See infra Appendix A.
162. See infra Appendix A.
163. See infra Appendix A.
164. See infra Appendix A. I say "they," but I do this, too. Nearly everyone does.
165. See infra Appendix A.
166. See infra Appendix A.
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Unfortunately, we have seen the results of relying on this sort of ad
hoc, bit-by-bit approach to privacy, wherein every company comes up
with its own privacy standards and its own ways to permit consumers to
opt in or out of various violations. 167 The internet is just too all
encompassing, and the companies that effectively run it are just too
omnipresent1 68 -even if consumers begin to view privacy as theirs, a
random approach tucked at the end of a long list of terms and conditions
will not result in the kind of systemically protective approach to privacy
rights that we ought to have. Instead, what is needed is a silver bulletan all-in-one ability to force internet service providers to pay attention to
our rights and to respond to them. Fortunately, there is such a bulletand it has been used elsewhere with real results.16 9
B.

Giving People the Tools to Protect Themselves

The key, I think, is to allow people to fully protect themselves. If
they had this ability, easily exercised, they would feel empowered and
entitled to their privacy rights-they would no longer shrug their
shoulders in collective apathy in the face of technological encroachment
if they knew it was within their power, and their right, to stop it. And the
way to do this is already well established, though not in our country.1 7 0
In the United States, the publication of truthful information is
generally protected by the First Amendment 171 even when that
information is potentially embarrassing for the person it covers 172 or
otherwise imposes on their privacy. 173 Significantly, the United States
extends this protection to online platforms like YouTube and Google, as
well.1 74 Other countries do not, instead prioritizing an individual's right
to be forgotten or right to erasure.'7 5

167.

See Alfred Ng, Default Settings for Privacy - We Need to Talk, CNET (Dec. 21, 2019,

5:00 AM), https://www.cnet.com/news/default-settings-for-privacy-we-need-to-talk.

168. See Bokhari, supra note 6.
169. See infra notes 176-81 and accompanying text.
170. See infra notes 176-81 and accompanying text.
171. See Smith v. Daily Mail Publ'g Co., 443 U.S. 97, 103 (1979) ("[I]f a newspaper lawfully
obtains truthful information about a matter of public significance[,] then state officials may not
constitutionally punish publication of the information, absent a need to further a state interest of the
highest order.").
172. See Fla. Star v. B.J.F., 491 U.S. 524, 532-33 (1989) (holding state law criminalizing the
publication of sexual offense victims' names unconstitutional).
173. See Judith Haydel, Privacy, MIDDLE TENN. STATE UNIV., https://www.mtsu.edu/first-

amendment/article/1141/privacy (last visited Aug. 1, 2021).
174. See Garcia v. Google, Inc., 786 F.3d 733, 745-47 (9th Cir. 2015) (noting that, while one
may wish to have certain information "forgotten and stripped" from an online platform, there is no
"right to be forgotten" in the United States).

175. See id. at 745.
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The European Union-and, therefore, its twenty-seven member
countries-recognizes such a right. 17 6 In adopting this position, the
European Union addresses the difficulty many face when trying to
escape or conceal unpleasant personal information-and, thus, gives
177
"[T]he
people the ability and prerogative to take care of themselves.
right to be forgotten addresses an urgent problem in the digital age: it is
very hard to escape your past on the Internet now that every photo, status
17 8
update, and tweet lives forever in the cloud."
The concept actually originates in a much narrower "right of
oblivion" under French law, which allows an individual with a criminal
history to object when someone publishes facts surrounding his
conviction after he has served his time for the crime and has been
rehabilitated. 7 9 The European Union's "right to be forgotten" doctrine
builds upon that idea and is much broader-it extends well beyond
180
It applies to the
information relating to criminal convictions.
or no longer
irrelevant
"inadequate,
is
that
information
processing of any
181
processing.
its
for
relevant, or excessive in relation to the purposes"
This sweeping definition raises many questions that are still being
83
for
thought through and settled.1 82 In Google Inc. v. Gonzalez,'
articles
newspaper
remove
Google
example, Gonzalez sought to have
mentioning "a real-estate auction connected with attachment
proceedings for the recovery of social security debts" from the list of
results appearing when his name was entered into the website's search
engine.184 The Court of Justice of the European Union held that a search
engine operator like Google is a "data processor" required to grant valid
erased under the European
requests to have information
85
Union-recognized right to be forgotten.'

176. 1995 O.J. (L 281) 31; see also Case C-131/12, Google Inc. v. GonzAlez,
ECLI:EU:C:2014:317, 1 2 (May 13, 2014); Court of Justice of the European Union Press Release
70/14, An Internet Search Engine Operator Is Responsible for the Processing that It Carries Out of
Personal Data Which Appear on Web Pages Published by Third Parties (May 13, 2014).
177. See Jeffrey Rosen, The Right to be Forgotten, 64 STAN. L. REV. ONLINE 88, 89 (2012).
178. Id. at 88.
179. Id.
180. See Court of Justice of the European Union Press Release 70/14, supra note 176.
181. Id.
182. Inadequate to accomplish what, exactly? Irrelevant or no longer relevant to what issue?
And who decides what the purpose for a particular data processing instance is or was? See, e.g.,
FED. R. EVID. 401 (defining evidence as relevant if it "make[s] a fact [at issue] more or less
probable than it would be without the evidence").
183. Case C-131/12, ECLI:EU:C:2014:317 (May 13, 2014).
184. Id. at¶¶ 14-15.
185. Court of Justice of the European Union Press Release 70/14, supra note 176.
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In addition to the undeniably broad substantive nature of the right
to be forgotten, the Gonzdlez decision seemed to grant a geographically
broad (possibly global) reach, as well.186 There, the court held that where
the search engine operator has some establishment in a member state, the
requirements apply even if the organization "has its seat in a nonmember [s]tate." 87 It therefore held the requirements applicable to
Google Inc., even though Google asserted that the data processing itself
happened in a non-member state.188 The court later limited its holding,
finding that processors were only required to block or "de-reference"
affected search results in member states.1 89 In other words, the search
results may remain on versions of the search engine serving non-member
states, like the United States. 190
Of course, this right to be forgotten does create burdens on the right
to free speech.191 After all, at its core, the regulation allows one person
to initiate the suppression of another's speech. 192 And the likelihood of
suppression is compounded by the burden the right to be forgotten
places on data processors, like Google, should they choose to refute the
right in any given situation because, while the procedure for submitting a
request to have your information erased is remarkably simple, 193 the
requirements for denying that request is not.1 94 If the organization
receiving the request for erasure chooses to deny the request, it bears the
burden of justifying its decision by proving its interest in processing the
data overrides the requestor's right to be forgotten, which requires
showing the request was "unfounded or excessive." 195 If, on the other
hand, the data processor chooses to grant the request, it merely has to
take reasonable steps to verify the identity of the person submitting the

186. See id.
187. Id.
188. Id.
189. Court of Justice of the European Union Press Release 112/19, The Operator of a Search
Engine Is Not Required to Carry Out a De-Referencing on All Versions of Its Search Engine (Sept.
24, 2014).
190. Id. (noting that, while processors are not required to de-reference the affected information
on all versions of their search engines, they are nevertheless free to do so).
191.

Rosen, supra note 177, at 88, 90.

192. See id. at 88-91 (noting the risks of extending the right to be forgotten beyond just
rescinding something one person said about himself to what someone else lawfully said about him).
193.

Everything You Need to Know About the "Right to Be Forgotten," GDPR.EU,

https://gdpr.eu/right-to-be-forgotten (last visited Aug. 1, 2021) (noting there is no specified format
for an erasure request-such a request may be made either verbally or in writing and need not
contain the words "request for erasure" or "right to be forgotten" or reference the particular

authorities which apply).
194. See id.
195. Id. (listing the acceptable justifications for denying an individual's request for erasure).
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196
request and then erase the information "without undue delay."
Because such a substantially greater burden accompanies a decision to
deny, it seems likely many platforms will grant more requests than they
197
deny-thus, suppressing more speech than they fight to protect.
However, the import of this Article is really that such a burden
must be balanced against what is gained by granting this right to
individuals. This is not a one-sided analysis involving a naked loss of
rights. The loss of speech, on the one hand, is countered by the gain of
privacy rights on the other-a gain, I think, that will enable people to
enjoy rights that they already have and that have been widely forgotten
or abandoned. 198 Doing this will go a long way to righting the imbalance
we are all currently experiencing in the modern era, where we all have
less and less privacy, as the big technology companies become more and
1 99
more powerful.
Indeed, righting this imbalance is so important that the scale should
be tipped even further, I think. The European Union's General Data
Protection Regulation ("GDPR") does permit damages, but I do not
think it goes far enough. 20' Under the GDPR scheme, should a data
processor fail to timely remove information after a data subject submits
a valid removal request, the processor may face a number of financial
201

consequences.
202
Second, the
First, there is provision for administrative fines.
"material
any
processor may be held liable to individual data subjects for
203
However,
or non-material" damages suffered because of the delay.
calculating
of
difficulty
the
given
toothless,
somewhat
this seems
non-material damages, such as discrimination or damage to reputation.
2
These sorts of things are extremely difficult to quantify, 04 and, as
always, one has to remember that the state of play is a single individual
against a large corporation with virtually limitless resources. This is all
the more true, given that the European Union member state courts
require those alleging such damages to prove that actual non-material
196.
197.
198.
199.

Id. (quoting 2016 O.J. (L 1119) 1) ("'Undue delay' is considered to be about a month.").
See Rosen, supra note 177, at 88-92.
See supra Part V.A.
See supra Part II.

200. Everything You Need to Know About the "Right to Be Forgotten," supranote 193.

201. 2016 O.J. (L 119) 82-83.
202. Id. (imposing "effective, proportionate[,] and dissuasive"-sized fines for General Data
Protection Regulation ("GDPR") infringement).
203. See 2016 O.J. (L 119) 81-82 (imposing joint and several liability when more than one
entity is at fault for the damages suffered).
204.

Henrik

Hanssen,

Germany: New Case-Law on Immaterial Damages for GDPR

.

Infringements, JDSUPRA (Oct. 26, 2020), https://www.jdsupra.comleganews/germany-new-case4
law-on-immaterial-6395
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damages were suffered, it being insufficient to merely show a GDPR
infringement and allege non-material damages without substantiating
them. 20 s
Perhaps because of these difficulties (attendant as they are to the
lack of a substantial remedy), there seems to have been limited
application of Article 82 of the GDPR itself in cases involving the right
to be forgotten, specifically. 206 What is needed, then, is a robust method
to accurately capture the damages inflicted, to ensure that the value
thereof can be transferred back to the harmed party, and to ultimately
incentivize individuals to take on the very large corporations that are
reaping these profits by appropriating the property of individuals
everywhere.
What is called for in this scheme, I think, is the ability to pursue
American-style damages. Leaving up damaging information about
individuals (or, really, any information about them) is a significant
decision that dramatically affects those individuals-that, in the styling
and import of this Article, affects their property rights. Thus, it should be
treated as such, and that means that any damage resulting from such a
decision should be compensable in a way that accurately drives at the
damage done. To start, that means compensatory damages.
Compensatory damages are awarded "to a person as compensation,
indemnity or restitution for harm sustained," 207 with the amount of
damages intended to put the injured party in as good a position as they
were before the injury.208 "Compensatory damages do not include any
amount 'in excess of the damages [the plaintiff] has suffered' because
the 'plaintiff is entitled to be made whole and nothing more."' 209 This
has the effect of righting the wrong in that the wrong-doer has to bear (or

205. Id. It is currently unclear whether punitive damages are available under the General Data
Protection Regulation. Id. However, given the tendency of many member state courts to require
proof of actual damages, it seems unlikely punitive damages will be available in this context. Id.
206. However, some European Union ("EU") member courts have imposed liability based on
pre-GDPR EU directives and caselaw; for example, the Court of Appeal of Barcelona considered a
civil suit to recover damages for Google's untimely removal of offending web links. Giancarlo F.
Frosio, The Right to Be Forgotten:Much Ado About Nothing, 15 COLO. TECH. L.J. 307, 323 (2017).
In that case, the Spanish court found that Google was required to pay damages from the time it
"obtained actual knowledge of the offending links" to when it eventually removed them. Google

Inc., ECLI:EU:C:2014:317, 1 2 (reaching decision on damages in reliance on Council Directive
1995 O.J. (L 281) 31). And in Germany, the District Court of Heidelberg referenced the Court of
Justice of the European Union's Gonzdlez decision in awarding damages against Google because it
failed to promptly remove the links at issue upon notification. Frosio, supra note 206, at 323.
207. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 903 (AM. L. INST. 1979).
208. Jill Wieber Lens, Honest Confusion: The Purpose of Compensatory Damages in Tort and
Fraudulent Misrepresentation, 59 U. KAN. L. REv. 231, 235 (2011).

209. Id.
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internalize) the consequences of the wrong done, an end that is broadly
210
consistent with the primary purpose of tort law.
Compensatory damages are private in nature, with the victim
allowed a direct action against their injurer to achieve the cost-shifting
end, 211 rather than force the state, or the general public, to bear the cost
of returning the victim to a pre-injured position:
To the extent tort law is a forum for vindicating claims to repair, the
victim's connection to his injurer is fundamental and analytic, not
tenuous or contingent. That his injurer acted towards him in a way that
gives rise to [] legitimate [and just] claim[s] . . . to compensation is the
heart of the victim's assertion. This assertion connects the victim and
his injurer in an analytic way: they are connected to one another and to
no one else, in a way that makes a kind of sense of the structure of tort
21 2
law that economic analysis simply cannot.

Thus, to the extent the cost-shifting function of compensatory
damages is concerned, shifting the burden to the wrongdoing party
forces the cost to them rather than the victim or society more
generally. 213
This seems to me a fantastic fit, here, given the enormous profit
these tech companies are generating via the acts outlined herein. Again,
conceptualize these companies as essentially amortizing the value and
sanctity of our private lives. To say that they are monetizing our
personal information is a truism at this point, but, in reality, it is more
than that. They are actually transferring value from every individual to
themselves-they are, in a way, appropriating our personal lives,
amortizing that which is valuable to us, and shifting that reduction in
value to themselves. They are stealing our property, and every such act
of theft impoverishes each of us.

210. The "primary purpose of tort law is 'that wronged persons should be compensated for
their injuries and ... those responsible for the wrong should bear the cost of their tortious
conduct."' Jews for Jesus, Inc. v. Rapp, 997 So. 2d 1098, 1105 (2008) (quoting Clay Elec. Coop. v.
Johnson, 873 So. 2d 1182, 1190 (Fla. 2003)); see also Esmond v. Liscio, 224 A.2d 793, 799 (Pa.
1967) (noting that while compensatory damages tend to discourage tortious conduct, "[t]he function
of compensatory damages is primarily to shift the loss from a wholly innocent party to one who is at
fault"); JEFFERY J. SHAMPO, AM JuR. 2D TORTS § 2 (2d ed. 2021); Rizzuto v. Ladders, 905 A.2d
1165, 1173 (Conn. 2006) (quoting Lodge v. Arett Sales Corp., 717 A.2d 215 (1998)) (indicating that
compensatory damages shift the burden of the cost from the innocent party to the responsible party
or distribute the loss among appropriate entities based on the amount of harm the responsible party
has caused).
211. Alexandra Klass, Tort Experiments in the Laboratoriesof Democracy, WM. & MARY L.

REv. 1501, 1509-10 (2009).
212. Jules L. Colman, The Structure of Tort Law, 97 YALE L.J. 1233, 1249 (1998).
213. Klass, supra note 211, at 1509-10.
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There is a handy analogy to this: nuisance. 214 The tech companies
create enormous internal value and profit but bear none of the costs-the
true cost in loss of privacy, in loss of property value-associated with
that profit endeavor. What we need to do, then, is to redirect these
costs-to cause the companies that profit to internalize the externalities
that they are creating. Nuisance does this by standing, essentially, for the
maxim that every person should use his own property so as not to injure
that of another. 215 Of course, when we talk of "injury" in this context,
what we really mean is activity that does not match its external-facing
cost with external-facing benefit. 216 Though not arising directly from the
use of property, per se, the tech companies are doing this very thing:
engaging in activity that creates enormous cost for society, but benefits
only the company. An apt analogy would be pursuing a nuisance claim
for carbon emissions. 217 Facebook and Google are spewing pollution
every bit as much as ExxonMobil or Chevron-and profiting the same
way.
Damages, then, would tether the revenue to the cost. If Facebook
had to bear the cost associated with having the private photos of your
grandkids data-analyzed and data-mined, or otherwise utilized by the
company or a third party-if you had the right to quantify what level of
damage that caused you and to have Facebook compensate you
accordingly-then Facebook would presumably cease such activities.
Of course, that is a bit of a simplification. Facebook (or whatever
other horrible corporation is at hand) would still data-mine the photos of
your grandkids, even if it had to reimburse you for the damage caused by
such privacy violations, if the revenue it generated exceeded the
quantifiable cost to you. That is what nuisance is, obviously-an attempt
to create "optimal activity levels." 218 If, however, we really want to
empower people to control their own property, then we can move even
further by going beyond compensatory damages and permit those whose

214.

Keith N. Hylton, The Economics of Public Nuisance Laws and the New Enforcement

Actions, 18 SUP. CT. ECON. REV. 43, 68 (2010).
215. A private nuisance exists when one makes an improper use of his own property and, in
that way, injures the land or some other right of his neighbor. Id. "Strict nuisance liability is
desirable because it discourages the scale of an activity with negative externalities." Id.

216.

"If, as nuisance law implicitly assumes, normal risks are balanced off by positive

externalities, then excluding liability for normal risk leads to optimal activity levels." Id. at 59-60.

217. See Gary Bryner, The Rapid Evolution of Climate ChangeLaw, UTAH BAR J., March-Apr.
2007, at 22 (discussing Comer v. Nationwide Mut. Ins. Co., 2006 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 33123 (S.D.
Miss. Sept. 20, 2005)); Connecticut v. Am. Elec. Power, Inc., 406 F. Supp. 2d 265 (S.D.N.Y.
2005)).
218. See Hanssen, supra note 204, at 59-60.
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privacy property rights are violated to pursue punitive damages, as
well. 2 1 9
Punitive damages are generally awarded in excess of
22 0
compensatory damages in order to punish and deter. They deter future
behavior-of both the defendant and others-by imposing significant
damages on that kind of behavior and signaling to everyone involved
that future, similar behavior will result in economic damages that may
push such behavior well beyond the pale of economically justifiable
activity.
When the deterrent effect of punitive damages is aimed at the
defendant themselves, scholars refer to it as special deterrence, and when
the deterrent effect is aimed at others who would consider acting in a
manner similar to the defendant, scholars refer to it as general
deterrence. 22 1 Much like compensatory damages, punitive damages
achieve the deterrence function, in part, by forcing the tortfeasor to
internalize the cost of their wrongful conduct. 222 But, as some scholars
point out, this means that punitive damages only really serve a
deterrence function when they factor in the damages of other victims,
not party to the case, who either chose not to bring their claim or failed
to make the required showing.223 Proponents of this theory also advocate
for taking into consideration instances where tortfeasors escape liability.

219. Thus, echoing the original need to go beyond the GDPR's original damage scheme.
220. The Restatement Second of Torts describes the purpose of awarding punitive damages "to
deter him and others like him from similar conduct in the future." RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF

TORTS, supra note 207, at § 903. This was explicitly recognized by the United States Supreme
Court in Pacific Mutual Life Insurance Company v. Haslip., 499 U.S. 1, 19 (1991) ("[A]s under the
law of most States, punitive damages are imposed for purposes of retribution and deterrence.").
221. JACOB A. STEIN, STEIN ON PERSONAL INJURY Damages § 4:4 (3d ed. 1997). Jurisdictions
adopting the deterrence rationale recognize punitive damage awards satisfy both the general and
special deterrence purposes simultaneously. See STUART M. SPEISER ET AL., AMERICAN LAW OF

TORTS § 8:46 (2008) (quoting Ray Dodge, Inc. v. Moore, 479 S.w.2d 518, 523 (Ark. 1972)).
222. Kevin S. Marshall & Patrick Fitzgerald, Punitive Damages and the Supreme Court's
Reasonable Relationship Test: Ignoring the Economics of Deterrence, 19 ST. JOHN'S J. LEGAL

COMMENT. 237, 251 (2005).
223. Sheila B. Scheuerman, Two Worlds Collide: How the Supreme Court's Recent Punitive
Damages Decisions Affect Class Actions, 60 BAYLOR L. REV. 880, 890-91 (2008) (stating that
"Professors Polinsky and Shavell urge a cost internalization approach to punitive damages. Under
this theory, a punitive damages award is imposed in order to make up for the number of times ... a
tortfeasor escapes liability"). It is true that some other scholars say the deterrence function is best
served through a "gain elimination" theory, which values a punitive damage award based on the
illicit gains to different people and businesses-similar to disgorgement of profits. Id. at 891-92.
But proponents of this view still advocate taking into consideration instances where tortfeasors
escape liability. "Instead of taking into account the total harm caused, the calculation 'requires the
court to divide the defendant's gain by the probability of liability.' '[T]he penalty should be at least
as large as the minimum of the illicit gain expected by the offender."' Jill wieber Lens, Justice
Holmes'sBad Man and the Depleted Purposesof Punitive Damages, 101 KY. L.J. 789, 796 (2013).
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It is true that the ability of punitive damages to shape behavior has
been considerably limited because of recent Supreme Court decisions
limiting the availability of punitive damages. In BMW of North America,
Inc. v. Gore,22 4 the United States Supreme Court reversed a two-milliondollar punitive damage award as unconstitutional in violation of due
process. 225 The Court laid down three guides to determine the propriety
of a punitive damage award including: (1) the reprehensibility of the
conduct; (2) the relationship between the harm suffered and the damage
award; and (3) the difference between comparable civil penalties and the
punitive damage award. 22 6
The Court refined its punitive damage jurisprudence in State Farm
Automobile Insurance Co. v. Campbell,227 where the Court followed the
Gore guideposts, but further explained that "[a] State cannot punish a
defendant for conduct that may have been lawful where it occurred,"
even though that conduct may be relevant to the case. 228 The Court
further significantly noted "few awards exceeding a single-digit ratio
between punitive and compensatory damages, to a significant degree
will satisfy due process." 229 The Court added that when "compensatory
damages are substantial, then a lesser ratio, perhaps only equal to
compensatory damages, can reach the outermost limit of the due process
guarantee." 23 0 Taken together, these limitations dull the potential effect a
punitive damages award would have in deterring future conduct. 23
Indeed, in analyzing the effects of the United States Supreme
Court's punitive-damage jurisprudence in federal common law, some
scholars directly argue limitations like the ratio limitation undermine the
deterrence function:
The Court also gave no explanation regarding how the damages might
achieve deterrence and hurt the damages' ability to achieve any notion
of deterrence by failing to acknowledge the effects of under-detection
and under-enforcement. Without some consideration of the chances of

224. 517 U.S. 559 (1996).
225. Id. at 575.
226. Id.
227. 538 U.S. 408 (2003).
228. Id. at 421.
229. Id. at 425.
230. Id.
231. Cf Mathias v. Accor Economy Lodging, Inc., 347 F.3d 672, 675-77 (7th Cir. 2003)
(acknowledging that limiting the availability of punitive damages lessens the ability of courts to
punish reprehensible conduct). Obviously, limiting punitive damage awards naturally decreases
their deterrent effect.
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escaping liability, punitive damages have less ability to achieve
32
whatever type of deterrence the state might seek.

This perhaps seems overwrought. The United States Department of
Justice conducted a study on punitive damages in 2005 and found that
general civil cases awarded punitive damages in only 5% of the cases
where plaintiffs prevailed. 2 33 Further, general trends revealed punitive
damage awards were down by 33% in general tort cases from 2001 to
2005, 46.1% down in medical malpractice cases over the same period,
23 4
The
and 70.4% in product liability cases, also over the same period.
median punitive damage amount awarded in all the cases surveyed was
only between $38,000 and $50,000.235 Given the relatively low rates and
amounts at which punitive damages are awarded, the deterrent effect of
punitive damages is on the decline-after all, their function cannot be
23 6
fulfilled if they are not issued.
But, to the point at hand, it certainly seems reasonable to conclude
that punitive damages, as an enforcement mechanism, could help force
large tech companies to respect others' property. This seems particularly
apt, given the extent to which punitive damages speak to attempting to
lasso in the damages incurred by non-parties. Again, returning to the
nuisance analogy or example, what we are trying to do is cause these
companies to truly bear the actual costs associated with their activitiesof course, in the case at hand, but also more broadly. This is the only
way to re-appropriate the broad property rights we all used to enjoy but
have now ceded to Facebook. In any event, it seems almost certain that a
small (probably a vanishingly small) percentage of people will ever seek
to validate these claims in court-the damages we are talking about, on
an individual basis, are very difficult to conceive of, or prove, and are
unlikely to be high enough to justify the individual effort for most
people. But the damages, on a society-wide level, are massive.
Permitting punitive damages as a bridge between individual plaintiffs
and the calamity of culture-wide property theft seems reasonable and

&

232. Lens, supra note 223, at 834.
233. Fact Sheet: Punitive Damages: Rare, Reasonable and Limited, CTR. FOR JUST.
DEMOCRACY (Apr. 2011), https://centejd.org/content/fact-sheet-punitive-damages-rare-reasonableand-limited-2011. It also found that medical malpractice and products liability cases only resulted in
punitive damages in approximately 1% of successful cases. Id.
234. Id.
235. Id.
236. Marshall & Fitzgerald, supra note 222, at 249 & n.41 (2005) (stating that punitive
damages are awarded in 2% to 4% of cases in studies conducted, and in cases where punitive
damages were awarded they were for low amounts); Michael Conklin, FactorsAffecting Punitive
Damage Awards, FLA. COASTAL L. REv. (Forthcoming 2020) ("[Punitive Damages] are rare,

occurring in only 6% of civil cases that result in a monetary award.").
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directly in line with what punitive damages are typically thought to be
for.

2 37

Speculation is, of course, difficult in assessing how effective
punitive damages really are at deterring conduct: the amount of
damages; the nature of the industry involved; whether the defendant is a
private citizen, a small business, a corporation, or a multi-national
corporation-these things could all have an effect. 23 8 But the concept, as
an economic principle, seems beyond question: disincentivizing property
theft results in less property theft. And tying that directly to the ability of
individuals to pursue what we are arguing is a stolen property right-it
seems the perfect fit of remedy and right.
The right to be forgotten, then, seems like an excellent scaffold
upon which to shore up our flagging rights. This is well beyond what
American courts and statutes currently recognize, but is broadly
consistent with equating privacy as property, in that it merely couches
control and power in the hands of the owner. It is simply, in other words,
allowing us to control what is ours-to treat our castle as our own, as it
were. But hanging American-style compensatory and punitive damages
on that scaffolding would go even further and do even more to help us
all protect what is ours.

237. An analogy would be the idea of permitting a property owner to sue for punitive damages
for simple trespass, in certain situations. Imagine, for instance, somebody who owns a home on a
very busy corner, favored by many, many passers-by. Every day, thousands of pedestrians cut
across the property, damaging it badly. If the property owner can sue each one for their contribution
to the damage to her home, that is good-it does, in fact, cause the defendant pedestrian to
internalize the cost of the ten to fifteen seconds that he cuts off of his commute each day. However,
the homeowner would have to sue thousands of people. Unless she can pursue punitive damages. If
she could get a damages award of, say, $10,000 (or $100,000 or $1,000,000-er whatever number
is needed), then each pedestrian will likely second-guess their trespass, for, while it is unlikely that
any one of them will be sued, the consequences of being that unlucky defendant are too great to
ignore. The analogy is not perfect, but it seems reasonably similar, and serves to demonstrate the
concept, as applied to property theft or trespass.
238. The McDonald's coffee burn case serves to illustrate the inadequacies of punitive
damages awards in shaping conduct. Liebeck v. McDonald's Restaurants, P.T.S., Inc., 1995 WL
360309, at *1 (D.N.M. Aug. 18, 1994); Allison Torres Burtka, Liebeck v. McDonald's: The Hot
Coffee Case, AM. MUSEUM TORT L., https://www.tortmuseum.org/liebeck-v-mcdonads (last visited
Aug. 1, 2021). In the case, a 79-year-old woman was served coffee from McDonald's that, when
spilled, was hot enough to cause third-degree burns on 16% of her body. Liebeck, 1995 WL 360309
at *1. The jury awarded the woman $160,000 in compensatory damages and originally $2.7 million
in punitive damages. See id. The trial court reduced the punitive damage award to $480,000, but
ultimately the case was settled while this award was on appeal. See id. Even after this case awarding
punitive damages, and the over-700 similar instances of coffee burns, McDonald's did not change
the temperature at which it kept its coffee in the wake of the McDonald's coffee case. See id.
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CONCLUSION

The law has shifted without us noticing much. Privacy rights,
which seem at an all-time low ebb, are really a function of property law,
rather than tort law. 239 Though traditionally conceived of as an
outgrowth of the latter area of law, this is really an almost in rem right
that speaks to others and warns them of how they have to interact with
the owner.240 Unfortunately, that shift has been accompanied by an
241
Our legal
almost wholesale abandonment of that property right.
they need
tools
the
with
people
arm
and
system should acknowledge this
to understand, appreciate, and protect their rights. Adopting a
European-style right to be forgotten will go a long way in that direction
and will ultimately do much to reverse the massive losses suffered by us
all in the last one or two decades.24 2 Only such a systemic change will
set things right and allow us to live in our homes and enjoy our lives
without the omnipresent concern that someone is watching over us and
monetizing our lives.
APPENDIX A

Here are the questions and responses to the 2019 survey I gave to my
students:
Question 1
How often do you use social media?
5+ times per day.........................................36.6% (34
1-3 times per day...........................................43% (40
1-3 times per week ........................................ 14% (13
Never ............................................................ 6.5% (6

respondents)
respondents)
respondents)
respondents)

Question 2
How often do you use email?
5+ times per day.........................................52.7% (49
1-3 times per day........................................41.9% (39
1-3 times per week ........................................ 5.4% (5
Never ............................................................... 0% (0
239.
240.
241.
242.

respondents)
respondents)
respondents)
respondents)

See supra PartlV.
See supra Part IV.
See supra Part V.A.
See supra Part V.B.
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Question 3
How often do you conduct internet searches?
5+ times per day.........................................52.7% (49
1-3 times per day........................................41.9% (39
1-3 times per week ........................................ 5.4% (5
Never ............................................................... 0% (0

respondents)
respondents)
respondents)
respondents)

Question 4
How often do you use GPS?
Multiple times per day .................................. 12% (11 respondents)
A few times per week.................................60.9% (56 respondents)
Rarely ........................................................ 26.1% (24 respondents)
Never .............................................................. 1.1% (1 respondent)

Question 5
Do you expect third parties to be able to access the content you
post/communicate?
Yes ............................................................ 64.1% (59 respondents)
No..............................................................35.9% (33 respondents)

Question 6
Do you expect the providers of the services you're utilizing to be able
to access the content you post/communicate?
Yes ............................................................... 75% (69 respondents)
No.................................................................25% (33 respondents)
Question 7
Do you expect the providers of the servicers you're utilizing to be
able to sell, to third parties, the content you post/communicate?
Yes ............................................................ 40.9% (38 respondents)
No..............................................................59.1% (55 respondents)
Question 8
If you answered yes to [the above] questions, have you altered any
privacy settings within the [relevant] apps?
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Yes ............................................................ 79.6% (74 respondents)
No..............................................................20.4% (19 respondents)
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